Philosophy of love and sex
Elliston (Frederick Elliston, “In Defense of Promiscuity”) spells out five arguments condemning promiscuity and gives what he no doubt views as decisive counter-arguments:
The Western Norm and Technology;
The Inseparability Premise and Promiscuity;
Promiscuity as a Threat to Monogamy;
Lying, Deceiving, and Exploiting; and,
Personal Emotional Security and Growth
Which of these arguments do you think is the best of the five? That is, which argument do you think poses the most significant challenge to Elliston’s project of defending the moral acceptability of promiscuity. Justify your answer. What is the argument, as you construe it from Elliston’s account? Are Elliston’s responses to it satisfactory? Why or why not? Finally, is there a sense or are there senses of objectification of the ten we’ve considered this semester, (quoting from Halwani, Raja Halwani, “On Fucking Around”,
Martha Nussbaum lists seven different ways to objectify someone. Rae Langton adds three. I quote them at length (this is also useful for the discussion in Part II). Nussbaums list:
Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her purposes.
Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and self-determination.
Inertness: The Objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in activity.
Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type and/or (b) with objects of other types.
Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary integrity, as something that is permissible to break up, smash, break into.
Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something owned by another, can be bought and sold, and so on.
Denial of subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as something whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account.
Langtons additional three:
Reduction to body: One treats [the person] as identified with his or her body, or body parts.
Reduction to appearance: One treats [the person] primarily in terms of how he or she looks, or how he or she appears to the senses.
Silencing: One treats [the person] as silent, lacking the capacity to speak.
which pose a special moral challenge to promiscuity? That is, does promiscuity pose a special risk of objectification–even if not necessarily, as Halwani argues–which are problematic for promiscuity? How should Elliston respond to this argument, were he given it?
